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SunTrust Bank, Inc. is a large, regional, financial services company located 
primarily in the Southeast, with total assets as of September 30, 2006 of $183.1 billion. l 
Through several subsidiaries, SunTrust Bank, Inc. provides an expansive range of 
financial services to individuals, businesses, and institutions. Chief among these is the 
flagship subsidiary, SunTrust Bank (the Company) which will be the focus of this case 
study. 
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SunTrust traces its history to its earliest predecessor, Farmers Bank of Alexandria, 
Virginia, established in 1811? SunTrust Banks, Inc. became a legal entity on July 1, 
1985, when Trust Company of Georgia and SunBanks, Inc. merged. The two banks 
carried their respective names until 1995 when all of the Company's banking units 
adopted the SunTrust name.3 In 2004, SunTrust merged with National Commerce 
Financial Corporation (NCF), keeping the SunTrust name and greatly expanding its 
presence in its geographic region. 
Presently, the Company operates 1,699 retail branches and 2,568 ATM's in 
Alabama, Arkansas, Florida, Georgia, Maryland, Mississippi, North Carolina, South 
Carolina, Tennessee, Virginia, West Virginia, and the District ofColumbia.4 The 
Company is further segregated into 59 distinct markets, loosely organized around cities 
of influence, allowing each market to cater its business mix to local clients. SunTrust 
prides itself on its ability to offer "big bank" capabilities and services with "small bank" 
customer service and responsiveness. 
The company is led by L. Phillip Humann, Chairman and Chief Executive 
Officer. Mr. Humann will vacate this post on December 31, 2006, and his already named 
successor will be James Wells, 3rd who is currently serving as Chief Operating Officer. 
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Mr. Wells joined the Company in 1998 as part of a merger with Crestar. He has 38 years 
of banking experience and is well prepared to manage the Company as he has worked 
closely with Mr. Humann in his capacity as COO. However, changes at the top levels of 
management should always be monitored for they bring with them a certain level of 
instability. 
2005 was a great year for SunTrust. Buoyed by the successful merger ofNCF 
and benefiting from favorable interest rate margins, the Company reported net income for 
2005 of $1.987 billion.5 This was the second consecutive year of record earnings. In 
February, 2006, the Board of Directors announced an 11 % dividend on shares of 
common stock.6 However, macro-environmental factors and a flat-to-inverted yield-
curve in 2006 have changed the industry outlook, and as such, the primary focus of this 
paper will be on SunTrust's 2006 performance and ways to compete in this new 
environment. 
In the 3rd quarter of2006, SunTrust reported net income of$535.6 million- a 5% 
increase from the previous year's 3rd quarter.7 This is a solid number given the prevailing 
inverted yield curve. This inverted yield curve and its implications will be discussed later 
in this text; however, some explanation is necessary. Short term interest rates such as 
those found on 3 month Treasury bonds were higher than those for long term interest 
rates such as 10 year Treasury bonds for much of2006. This is often driven by market 
expectations regarding inflation. If markets do not believe that there is a sufficient 
inflation premium imbedded in long term rates, they will move into short term securities. 
This affects banks because they pay interest on deposit accounts based on short term rates 
but often lend at long term rates. Ifbanks lend at low rates and pay depositors at high 
rates, their net interest margin (NIM) is negatively affected. This is referred to as an 
inverted yield curve. A flat yield curve occurs when short term rates are relatively close 
to long term rates. The inverted yield curve present for much of 2006 has had a great 
effect on banks' ability to earn profits. 
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SunTrust's net interest income in the 3rd quarter of2006 was $1.17 billion. This 
number is almost exactly the same as it was a year earlier. This is due in large part to the 
inverted yield curve. It is much more difficult to earn interest income in a flattening to 
inverted yield curve environment. An additional concern for banks in this environment is 
that customers are attracted to accounts paying this new, higher rate of interest, such as 
certificate of deposit accounts (CD's). When customers do this, they often move money 
from non-interest bearing accounts, such as free checking accounts, and into interest 
bearing CD's which cost the bank money in interest expense. This amplifies the effect of 
the inverted yield curve. 
SunTrust's positive income growth through the 3rd quarter of2006 was mainly 
attributable to its increase in non-interest income. Non-interest income increased 3% 
from the previous year to $858.9 million thus far in 2006. However, much of this 
increase came as a result of the sale of the Company's Bond Trustee business valued at 
$113 million.8 This was a business line that the Company came to view as non-integral 
to its business plan and it was sold to U.S. Bank in July, 2006.9 
The Company's non-interest expense rose in the 3rd quarter 2% from the previous 
year. This could be a cause for concern because in an inverted yield curve environment it 
is important to focus on managing costs; however, SunTrust feels that this increase in 
expenses will benefit the long-term viability of the company. According to the 
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Company, these additional non-interest expenses were used to invest in core 
infrastructure in revenue producing units. IO This investment was substantial; because in 
2005 SunTrust had significant merger expenses embedded into non-interest expense and 
in 2006 they had none. For non-interest expense to still rise without this merger expense, 
there must either have been substantial infrastructure investments or loose cost controls. 
Lines of Business 
SunTrust is organized around five main lines of business (LOB's): Retail, 
Commercial, Corporate and Investment Banking, Wealth and Investment Management, 
and Mortgage. I I A brief review of each of these units' functions and performance 
through the 3rd quarter of 2006 follows. 
Retail 
The Retail LOB focuses primarily on individuals and businesses with less than $5 
million in total sales. Retail banking gives customers access to loans and deposit 
accounts. Once a client's needs change, (they outgrow the $5 million limit, they need a 
mortgage, investment advice, etc.) they are "cross-saled" into a more appropriate LOB. 
Retail banking is done primarily through branch banks, both traditional free-standing 
branches and In-Store branches located in shopping centers such as Wal-Mart, Kroger, 
and Publix. SunTrust had In-Store branches prior to its merger with NCF, but has since 
expanded its portfolio and skill at In-Store banking with the merger. NCF was an early 
pioneer of In-Store banking. It was the first bank to make In-Store banking successful on 
a large-scale basis and has brought those same skills and expertise to its relationship with 
SunTrust. I2 
The Retail LOB posted net income of $583 million for the nine months ended 
September 30, 2006. 13 This represented a 22% increase over the previous year. This 
shows good growth in deposits, though much of the growth has been in interest bearing 
CD's and money market accounts. Additionally, the retail LOB's provision for loan 
losses (essentially net charge-offs) decreased 34% over this period. This is important 
because it shows discipline and good practices on the Company's front line for risk 
control-extending loans and accounts to people who can manage them. Overall, the 
Company reduced loan loss provisions by 14% for the nine months ended September 30, 
2006. 14 
Commercial 
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The Commercial LOB manages clients between $5 million and $250 million in 
annual sales. It provides financial services such as lending, cash management, risk 
management, investment strategies, merchant processing, and corporate bankcards. 15 
This unit posted net income of $325.3 million for the nine months ended September 30, 
2006. 16 This positive outcome was the result of strong growth in construction lending, an 
increase in institutional and government deposits, and a 61 % decline in provision for loan 
losses, a savings of $11.1 million. 17 
Corporate and Investment Banking 
Corporate banking focuses on customers with over $250 million in annual sales. 
Corporate banking provides clients with investment banking, treasury management, 
merchant banking, access to capital markets, and a host of other financial services. This 
LOB was hit hard by the inverted yield curve in 2006. It reported a 16% decrease in net 
income in the 3rd quarter and a 9% decrease for the nine months ended September 30, 
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2006. 18 This decrease was the result of a narrowing NIM and lower income from capital 
markets. Corporate and investment banking is extremely competitive because firms in 
search of capital have many choices. SunTrust must compete for these loans against 
other large national and international banks and against capital markets. 19 This often 
results in lower interest rate spreads-which are further contracted due to the inverted 
yield curve. This component of SunTrust's business model is extremely susceptible to 
macro-economic factors because of its reliance on income generated from capital markets 
and its reliance on the welfare of its clients-large corporations. It is important that it 
capture non-interest income such as fee income. So far, in 2006, corporate and 
investment banking non-interest income is down 7%. This needs to be corrected for this 
unit to return to profitability. 
Mortgage 
The Mortgage LOB originates and services residential mortgages for individuals 
and businesses. Sun Trust also sells a portion of its real estate portfolio in the secondary 
market. This LOB has been a substantial driver of net income for the Company 
throughout the "housing boom". Through September 30 2006, Mortgage reported a 62% 
increase in net income over the previous year. This net income was the result of higher 
captured fee income based on higher production. Construction loans and residential real 
estate were the drivers of this increased production. Total non-interest income increased 
78% during this period. While this LOB contributes less to the bottom line (only 8% of 
YTD net income), it is a high margin, high fee business and offers diversification of 
assets to the Company's portfolio. To this end, the Company recently expanded its 
Mortgage line, opening 51 new offices in 2005 and increasing the sales force by 24%.20 
Wealth and Investment Management 
This LOB caters to individuals and institutions wanting active financial 
management. Wealth and Investment is split into segments for individuals-Private 
Wealth Management (PWM)-and institutions-Institutional Investment Management 
(lIM). Each of these segments further breaks down into units that cater to the specific 
needs of their client base. Trusco Capital Management handles retirement services, 
corporate trusts, and endowments. Asset Management Advisors cater to the "ultra high 
net worth" clients, assisting in multi-generational asset management tasks such as 
investments, trusts, wills, etc. There are several additional subsidiaries segmented under 
the umbrella of wealth and investment management. One area that SunTrust has had 
much success, and indeed was a market innovator, has been in wealth management. 
They actively seek high net worth segments and attempt to bank them. SunTrust 
successfully became the "bank of country music" in the late 1980's with a substantial 
roster of country musicians utilizing its services. It has expanded this service into 
NASCAR-banking drivers and owners. It also banks several professional athletes, 
professional and collegiate coaches, and entertainers. This can be an expensive, labor 
intensive enterprise, but SunTrust has had great success banking the "newly rich.,,21 
In the nine months ended September 30, 2006, Wealth and Investment 
Management reported net income of $216.5 million, representing an increase of 50% 
over the previous year. 22 However, this number is skewed because of the sale of Bond 
Trustee business for $69.9 million. After adjusting for this sale, net income grew only 
10/0. This tepid growth was attributed to increased non-interest expense of 8% which the 
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Company's attributes to, "efforts to build out the line of business, including higher 
structural, staff and operations expenses. ,,23 
SWOT Analysis 
Strengths 
High Credit Rating 
Customer Service 
Reaping Benefits of NCF Merger 
In-Store Distinctive Competency 
Strategic Banking Agreement with Wal-Mart 
Talent Management I Leadership 
Sun Trust University 
High Growth Markets 
Strong Revenue Growth 
Opportunities 
Banking the Unbanked 
Immigrant Banking 
Outsourcing Non-Core Functions 
Southwest Expansion 
Rural Expansion 
Increase Current Market Penetration 
Expand Wealth Management LOB 
Strengths 
Weaknesses 
Low Tier One Ratio 
No Key Person Life Insurance 
Volatile Stock Price 
Low Market Penetration 
Large Non-Performing Loan 
3rd Party Providers of Infrastructure 
Threats 
Economic Conditions 
Inverted Yield Curve 
Government Regulation 
Basel II Accord 
Natural Disasters 
Strong & Diverse Competition 
Real Estate Downturn 
• SunTrust has consistently maintained a high credit rating. Standard & Poor's 
credit ratings are A+ for senior debt, A for subordinated debt, and A-I for short 
term commercial paper.24 Other rating services provide similar evidence. 
SunTrust has consistently outperformed peers in annualized net charge-offs.25 
This is due to a solid approach to credit risk management. 
• SunTrust prides itself on its high levels of customer service. It is a priority 
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ingrained in the corporate culture and in the Company's hiring practices. This has 
been born out in recent customer satisfaction surveys: 
o In August, 2005, SunTrust Mortgage ranked #1 in customer satisfaction 
among mortgage servicing companies in a survey by J.D. Power & 
Associates.26 
o In November, 2006, SunTrust ranked 3rd in Small Business Banking 
Satisfaction survey by J.D. Power & Associates.27 
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• SunTrust is currently reaping the benefits of its recent merger with NCF. This 
merger, now fully integrated, has given the company a greater presence in key 
markets-namely Memphis, North Carolina, Tennessee, and South Carolina. It 
has also improved market penetration in markets that SunTrust was already in. 
The merger also brought with it access to NCF's employee talent base and clients. 
Additionally, NCF provided SunTrust with critical know-how and expertise in the 
In-Store banking division. NCF pioneered this effective strategy and SunTrust 
has expanded their In-Store offering and achieved great results.28 
• SunTrust holds a distinctive competency in the In-Store market. Drawing from 
NCF's experience, SunTrust offers different pricing structures for its In-Store 
branches than its traditional ones. SunTrust successfully uses In-Store branches 
to augment its traditional branches in a hub and spoke manner. Traditional 
branches are used to generate and service commercial clients, and In-Store 
branches provide customer support to clients and access to enormous amounts of 
non-customers. In-Store branches cost lIih of the price to build a traditional 
brick and mortar branch, and their operating costs are 50-60% lower.29 SunTrust 
has effectively implemented the practice of expanding into new markets through 
In-Store proliferation rather than through acquisition. Typically, the Company 
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opens two In-Store branches for everyone traditional branch in each new market 
it enters.30 This has made growth less expensive and more viable. 
• In 2006, SunTrust reached a new strategic banking agreement with Wal-Mart, a 
partner in its In-Store banking franchise. Wal-Mart is the premier superstore for 
In-Store branches, and this should strengthen SunTrust's position in this market. 31 
According to Eugene Kirby, executive vice-president of SunTrust, the Company 
has 75 co-branded Wal-Mart Money Centers and has plans to add 27 more in the 
next three years.32 While SunTrust ranks 5th in the country in total In-Stores, it 
was the only company to expand its offering of In-Stores in 2005. Additionally, 
the industry leaders in terms of total In-Stores, Wells Fargo and Citizens, do not 
compete to a large degree in the Southeast. 
• SunTrust prides itself on its talent management and its strong executive team. 
The Company's top 10 executives each have over 30 years of banking experience. 
They have implemented a system to groom prospective leaders. They analyze 
5,600 key managers across the company on key leadership potential traits in order 
to establish "bench strength.,,33 The Company goes to great lengths to hire 
qualified, talented associates at all levels of business and trains them well. 
• SunTrust University-an expansive, in-depth, company wide initiative that seeks 
to train and empower employees. Employees can sign up for classes on product 
knowledge, compliance, and nearly every other facet of banking. SunTrust 
grooms employees for careers and has recently been honored as a Top 50 
Company to Start a Career by Business Week. 34 
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• SunTrust is located in key high growth geographical locations and holds leading 
market positions in many of them. SunTrust has 1,700 branches and 2,800 
ATM's which give it a strong regional presence. According to SunTrust, the 
weighted average population growth proj ection for the markets they have 
penetrated is 84% higher than the national average.35 
• SunTrust has experienced strong revenue growth in the past few years. 
According to Datamonitor, from 2003-2005, SunTrust revenues experienced a 
Compound Annual Growth Rate (CAGR) of24.1 %.36 In 2006, SunTrust projects 
a CAGR for revenues of 10%.37 This growth represents dividends from 
Sun Trust's strong expansion policy through this period. The Company is reaping 
the benefits of its acquisitions, NCF in particular. 
Weaknesses 
• SunTrust has a lower than industry average Tier One ratio. The Tier One ratio is 
a capital adequacy ratio that essentially measures how well a bank's equity and 
reserves insulate it from credit risk. 38 In Quarter 2 of 2006, SunTrust's Tier One 
ratio was 7.90 compared to an industry average of 8.28.39 This could represent a 
long-term issue for the Company because it is a sign of under capitalization. 
SunTrust has taken steps to improve its Tier One ratio, however. There are two 
principal ways to improve the Tier One ratio-increase capital or decrease risk. 
Because SunTrust's credit ratings are solid, risk has not historically been the 
problem. SunTrust is currently attempting to buy back much of its old preferred 
stock (which does not figure into Tier One ratios) and resell it as upgraded 
common stock which would qualify as Tier One capita1.4o This should prove an 
effective strategy for improving its Tier One ratio. 
• Sun Trust does not currently carry key person life insurance on any of its 
executives.41 This is a potential liability and a relatively inexpensive fix. 
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• SunTrust states in its 2005 Annual Report that the volatility of its stock price is a 
major concem.42 Beginning December 1, 2005, SunTrust's 52 week range is 
$69.68 -- $83.31.43 The Company attributes this to a number of factors, 
including: variations in quarterly operating results, seasonal fluctuations, 
competitor actions, market fluctuations, economic and political conditions, and 
interest rate changes.44 These are necessarily vague reasons for a volatile stock 
price. However, they do underscore the myriad complexities facing a large 
regional financial institution. 
• In 2005, SunTrust commissioned a market data research project utilizing Claritas 
data and Integra Market Audit.45 That study found that SunTrust faced some 
issues related to market penetration. In response to the question, "What financial 
institutions do you currently do business with?" SunTrust's penetration was about 
half that of the market leaders. In response to the question, "What is your primary 
financial institution?" SunTrust ranked third in its markets. These are numbers 
that can be improved upon. SunTrust's expansion strategy has been to enter 
markets in full force, often opening 15-30 branches in a city upon entrance into 
the market. This makes the issue of penetration all the more important because it 
shows that SunTrust's penetration lags not from lack of branch presence but for 
some other reason. This could result from lack of brand awareness-the SunTrust 
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brand has only been around since 1995. However, in this day and age of 
increased merger activity, consumers should be accustomed to new brand names. 
• SunTrust placed a $200 million loan on non-accrual status in the 3rd quarter of 
2006.46 This non-performing loan is a big hit against the Company's loan loss 
provisions and is far larger than the previous highest non-performer of $40 
million. Given SunTrust's overall solid credit quality, analysts question why 
SunTrust was left holding a loan this large-Christopher Marinac, with FIG 
Partners, LLC, said the size of the loan was "bizarre.,,47 It is typical in the 
industry to sell off portions of large loans in the secondary market to hedge risk. 
Mr. Humann said that "this is a one-off occurrence, and it does not reflect a 
portfolio trend whatsoever.,,48 The Company said that the borrower lost a major 
client and was unable to meet its obligations. This underscores the derivative 
nature of banking-a bank's profits are closely tied to the financial success of its 
clients and the performance of the economy as a whole. 
• SunTrust currently relies on third party companies to provide certain elements of 
its infrastructure such as its intranet network.49 If one of these companies were to 
fail or otherwise be unable to provide service, SunTrust would be adversely 
affected .. .if not crippled. 
Opportunities 
• There is a significant opportunity for banks to "bank the unbanked." According 
to a 2001 Federal Reserve Study, 9% of all American families are unbanked-
meaning that they do not have a "transaction account with a traditional financial 
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institution.,,5o This represents a substantial untapped portion of the market. In my 
opinion, banks have shied away from this segment for a couple of reasons: 1) 
Banks underestimated their need for financial services. The majority of the 
unbanked are in the lower income levels. These people often have poor credit and 
bad financial habits. 2) There are significant risks and increased compliance costs 
associated with banking in this spectrum. 3) Bank branches are often located near 
commercial centers and affluent populations. This lack of infrastructure is often 
used as an excuse for not providing services to the unbanked. Banks should not 
be looking to make excuses for not banking the unbanked. The fact is, the 
unbanked represent a sizable market and products can be devised that cater to 
their needs and add to the overall health of a bank. 
• A key portion of this unbanked population is immigrants. According to the same 
Federal Reserve study, 22% of non-whites and Hispanics are unbanked.51 This 
popUlation segment represents an enormous opportunity. The majority of 
immigrants have come to America looking for jobs, and they often send money 
back home in the form of remittances. Banks have typically lost out on this 
revenue stream. With some creativity and effort, banks should be able to capture 
this segment and cement relationships with this segment of the unbanked 
population. 
• Competing in an inverted yield curve environment, in particular, and good 
business sense in general, calls for a focus on cost reduction. SunTrust currently 
out-sources certain business functions such as maintenance of its network. There 
may be an additional opportunity to outsource other non-core support functions. 
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Maintenance, PP&E, and any other non-essential function should be analyzed and 
if possible, outsourced. This could result in cost savings and increased focus on 
core competencies. 
• SunTrust should take a hard look at expanding its footprint. Specifically, the 
Southwest region. This is a rapidly expanding region and mirrors the Southeast in 
a lot of ways. 52 This could be accomplished through merger given the 
consolidation trend in the industry. SunTrust could also expand through its In-
Store branch franchise. So far, the Company has chosen to not go this route, 
focusing instead on its current footprint. 
• SunTrust is currently focused primarily in cities. For instance, in Tennessee, the 
vast majority of branches are located in Memphis, Nashville, Knoxville, 
Chattanooga, and their immediate surrounding areas. There is an opportunity for 
SunTrust to expand into small towns and rural areas. Given the ease and relative 
inexpensiveness of establishing In-Store banks, this could be a viable opportunity. 
• SunTrust should look to increase current market penetration per the Claritas study 
stated earlier. There is an obvious lacking of core penetration in markets 
throughout SunTrust footprint. Becoming the market leader in each of its key 
markets will improve visibility, brand recognition, and reputation. 
• SunTrust has had great success with its Wealth Management LOB. Particularly, 
SunTrust has catered to entertainers, athletes, musicians, etc. This should be 
expanded on. The company should look for new segments of the population with 
"new money." Attorney, doctors, dentists, etc., should be approached as they 
graduate and cemented as clients. Lottery winners are another possibility. 
Wealth Management is a distinctive competency that SunTmst holds, and it 
should be expanded. 
Threats 
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• The most significant threat(s) that banks face are macroeconomic forces. The 
overall state of the economy has enormous implications for banks' profitability. 
Banks offer, essentially, derivative services. Because they rely on the overall 
financial condition of their customers-individuals and businesses-their 
profitability is directly tied to the profitability of their customers. Rising interest 
rates dampen the demand for loans which are a bank's primary source of revenue. 
Additionally, depressed economic conditions hurt a bank's ability to sell its loans 
for a profit by depressing the portfolio's value. Poor economic conditions also 
increase the amount of charge-off deposit accounts and delinquent loan accounts. 
Rising interest rates also signal the start of industry chum, as customers become 
more willing to relocate their money at institutions paying higher interest rates on 
deposit accounts. As customers move more and more money into interest-bearing 
accounts, banks lose their ability to generate low-cost deposit accounts and their 
NIM decreases. Macroeconomic forces are the most critical threat that banks 
face, and unfortunately, they are the hardest to counteract. 
• The inverted yield curve has become a pressing threat in 2006. Competing in an 
inverted yield curve environment is difficult and strategies must focus around 
cutting costs and improving non-interest income collection. 
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• Banks face heavy regulation from state and federal agencies, and this constitutes a 
threat to the banking industry. 53 Compliance represents a significant cost burden. 
Changes, updates, and new policies can have a negative impact that banks will be 
unable to alter. Regulatory agencies make rulings prohibiting the kinds of 
products banks can sell. They can also decide who can compete in the industry. 
Non-bank financial institutions can now provide services previously restricted to 
commercial banks. Because these non-banks are not subject to the same 
regulations, they can operate with lower cost structures. 54 Additionally, monetary 
and fiscal policy can have a substantial effect on banks. Through its control of the 
money supply and the federal funds rate, the Federal Reserve can control the cost 
of lending and investing funds. This can directly affect banks bottom line and is a 
factor over which they have little control. 
• The Basel II Accord offers an example of government intervention and also poses 
a unique threat to banks. The Basel II Accord is an international regulation that 
attempts to match a bank's capital level with its risk level. The Basel II Accord 
updates a previous Accord and fine-tunes the procedures used to assess a bank's 
risk level and adjusts the capital requirements mandated for each risk level. This 
is a unique risk to SunTrust because of its low Tier 1 ratio. Basel II would require 
SunTrust to hold additional reserves to insulate it from risk. Additionally, this 
adds significant compliance costs. Basel II puts the onus of calculating risk and 
adjusting reserves on individual banks, and banks will have to purchase or 
originate expensive computer modeling software to do this.55 
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• SunTrust believes that natural disasters pose a serious risk to its profitability. 56 
This is because large scale natural disasters such as hurricanes (primarily, given 
the Company's geographical location), earthquakes, etc., damage property that 
was used to secure loans and also hurts the ability of effected customers to repay 
their loans. 
• There is some concern in the banking industry that technology advances will 
allow customers to "bank without banks.,,57 This is already the case, to a degree, 
as automated clearing of electronic transactions allows people to transfer fund 
without the use of banks. Will people choose to do this in the future? Ifpeople 
no longer deposit their money with banks, banks' ability to generate revenue from 
loans will be severely hampered. 
• The banking industry is a highly competitive industry. There are many players 
and competition is fierce. The growth of the global marketplace and 
improvements in technology allow customers the ability to use non-regional 
banks. A customer in Knoxville, Tennessee, may have their savings account with 
a brokerage firm in New York, for example. Even after deregulation, banks 
essentially offer the same services and similar rates, so it is critical to be able to 
compete on a different distinctive competency. Banks often promote high 
customer service levels because of this need to compete on something other than 
services or price. In this regard, SunTrust seems adequately positioned because of 
their strong customer service reputation. However, competition remains fierce 
and will likely only get fiercer as increased consolidation occurs and the 
emergence of non-bank banks such as insurance companies and brokerage firms 
skews the marketplace. 
• There are key signals of a downturn in real-estate demand.58 This will affect 
banks in two ways: First, volume of demand for residential real-estate has been 
decreasing, hurting bank's ability to originate real-estate loans. Second, rising 
interest rates will negatively affect the market for refinances and multiple 
mortgages. After 2000, low rates encouraged enormous volume in the refinance 
market. High interest rates create a disincentive for people to refinance their 
mortgages. 
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Industry Analysis 
The commercial banking industry is in the mature stage of the lifecycle. This 
seems a rather obvious point; however, one can argue that the industry has only reached 
this stage in the last 10-15 years. Deregulation and increased consolidation throughout 
the late 1970's and early 1980's brought intense rivalry in the early 1990's and the 
industry has stabilized somewhat since that time. The impact of technology on modem 
bank processes has slowed somewhat, and while technological change may once again 
upset the competitive balance, at this time, any surviving banks have integrated the 
technological advancements of the late 1990's. These stabilizing forces have had a 
maturing effect on the industry, and while the industry is growing in terms of revenues 
and size, it cannot be labeled a growth industry. 
According to a September, 2006 report by IBISWorld, industry revenues in 
current prices increased from $538.4 billIon in 2004 to $644.6 billion in 2005-a 16.5% 
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increase. 59 Industry gross product increased from $270.9 billion in 2004 to $302.5 
billion in 2005-and 8.6% increase. This growth was driven primarily by strong 
economic growth, high demand in the real estate market, and solid corporate earnings. 
Favorable market conditions contributed significantly to these numbers-for instance, 
industry revenues decreased each year in the three years following September 11 t\ 2001, 
-4.4%, -9.8%, and -3.0%, respectively.6o This underscores the industry's extreme 
exposure to macroeconomic conditions and cyclical business downturns. 
Key Competitors 
As of September 30, 2006, SunTrust ranked as the i h largest bank in terms of 
consolidated assets. 61 Bank of America leads the list, followed by JP Morgan Chase, 
Citibank, Wachovia, Wells Fargo, and U.S. Bank, and SunTrust. SunTrust's competition 
is varied and extensive. SunTrust faces competition from large commercial banks, 
community banks in each market it is located in, and also from non-banks such as credit 
unions, insurance companies, brokerage firms, and mortgage houses. For purposes of 
comparison, I have selected Bank of America, BB&T, and Wachovia as key rivals. 
Bank of America 
Bank of America is the behemoth of US banks. Its revenues in 2005 were $56.9 
billion62 compared to SunTrust's $7.8 billion.63 It is estimated that Bank of America 
holds 10% of the banking market.64 It has over 175,000 employees compared to 
SunTrust's 33,000.65 Headquartered in Charlotte, NC, Bank of America is a direct 
competitor of SunTrust. When SunTrust purchased NCF, they acquired branches of the 
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fonner Central Carolina Bank and greatly expanded their reach in North Carolina.66 
Bank of America's great size allows it to achieve economies of scale unrivaled in the 
banking industry. From my perspective, SunTrust has not shown inclinations to grow to 
the same size as Bank of America, preferring instead to be a more regionally located, 
smaller bank. 
BB&T 
BB&T, headquartered in Winston-Salem, North Carolina, is the 14th largest bank 
in the US, with roughly half the total assets ofSunTrust.67 However, BB&T's 
geographical footprint closely parallels SunTrust's.68 They are similar in operating 
model and size. BB&T's market capitalization is $23.5 billion and SunTrust's is $29.8 
billion.69 Because of their similarities and locations in the same markets, I believe these 
two banks are often seen as equals by consumers and thus competition between the two is 
fierce. In my opinion, the merger with NCF strengthened SunTrust's position in BB&T's 
home base-the Carolinas. 
Wachovia 
Wachovia, headquartered in Charlotte, North Carolina, is larger than SunTrust but 
smaller than Bank of America. It has a market capitalization of $86.89 billion, with 
93,000 employees, and revenues of$27 billion.7o Wachovia has a strong presence in key 
geographical areas-namely the Carolinas, Georgia, and Virginia. Wachovia merged 
with First Union in 2001, greatly expanding its reach. In order to complete the merger, 
Wachovia had to divest 37 branches to comply with anti-trust measures.71 NCF 
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purchased those branches, and they are now part of the Sun Trust family.72 Wachovia is a 
key player in the Southeast region, and a major competitor of SunTrust throughout its 
footprint. 
Comparative Data / Key Ratios (as of 12/31/2005) 
Key Industry Ratios 
Equity Assets% 
loans I Deposits% 
loan loss 
Reserves% 
PIE Ratio (Hi/lo) 
Dividend Yield 
SunTrust 
9.40 
0.90 
0.60 
14--12 
Bank of 
America 
7.80 
0.90 
0.60 
12--10 
(Hi/lo)% 3.4--2.9 4.6--4.0 
EPS 5.53 4.10 
BB&T Wachovia 
10.20 9.10 
1.00 0.80 
0.80 0.50 
15--12 14--11 
3.9--3.3 4.2--3.4 
3.02 4.13 
Revenue (CAGR) 21.90 13.30 7.30 14.90 
Net Income (CAGR) 26.30 16.40 6.10 23.30 
Source: Compiled from Standard and Poor's Industry Survey: Banking 11130/2006 
Recommendations 
• The number one issue depressing SunTrust's results in 2006 is the persistence of 
an inverted yield curve. While an inverted yield curve will not persist forever, 
some short-term strategies must be undertaken to stay competitive and profitable 
during this period. 
o SunTrust must focus on cost reduction through this period. Through the 
3rd quarter of2006, non-interest expense increased 2% from the previous 
year's mark. Cost reduction should be a major goal of the company 
through this period, and it has not been to date. 
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o At the same time, there should be a renewed focus on collection of non-
interest income. Non-interest income represents an opportunity for the 
company to diversify its income streams and limit its exposure to interest 
rate risk. Thus far in 2006, the Company reports non-interest income is up 
3% from the previous year; however, this is skewed by the sale of the 
Bond Trustee unit. Removing this sale, non-interest income is down 8% 
from the third quarter of2005. This is the exact opposite of what should 
occur. Wachovia's non-interest income increased 6% in the 3rd quarter of 
2006 over the previous year.73 BB&T's non-interest income increased 
9.1 % over the same period.74 Bank of America's non-interest income was 
up 57% over this period.75 
Non-interest income is primarily fee based income generated on loans, 
deposit accounts, investment accounts, etc. These fees are embedded in a 
bank's cost structure and must be collected. A company-wide focus 
should be set forth to capture this fee income. Collection of non-interest 
income should be incorporated into an incentive program. While the 
potential for lost customers exists, these fees have been disclosed to the 
customer and should not be viewed as an imposition. They represent the 
cost of doing business with the bank and must be collected. The company 
is essentially leaving money on the table ... shareholders should not be 
happy with this performance. 
o Banks can reduce their exposure to an inverted yield curve by hedging 
interest rates. This can be done through the use of derivatives and interest 
rate swaps. SunTrust has shown a willingness to do this. In 2005, 
hedging contributed $104.4 million to the Company's bottom line.76 
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o In inverted yield curve environments, banks should look to promote 
variable rate loans. When high rates persist, the inclination is to try and 
sell fixed-rate loans; however, selling variable rate loans can hedge a 
bank's risk when the yield curve is inverted. While variable rate loans are 
typically difficult for banks to sell, in an environment with high rates and 
an inverted yield curve the customer's desire for lower rates may align 
with a banks desire to hedge interest rate risk. 
o Banks should also look to promote free checking accounts. While 
customers are more inclined to invest their money in interest-bearing 
accounts, especially when high short-term interest rates persist, free 
checking accounts represent an inexpensive way for banks to earn deposit 
accounts. One key segment popUlation that is attracted to free checking 
accounts is the current unbanked population. Promotion of free checking 
accounts is the key to this strategy. 
• SunTrust should look to expand its Wealth and Investment business by focusing 
on the "newly rich." Strategies should be implemented to target high-income 
growth targets, such as lawyers, doctors, etc. before they cement relationships 
with other banks. A unit should be established to target graduate schools, perhaps 
offering loan consolidation services as a hook. Reduced fee accounts should be 
offered ... anything to get high income growth clients early and cement the 
relationship. 
• SunTrust should acquire life insurance on its top executives. This is relatively 
inexpensive and could provide substantial risk savings. 
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• SunTrust should seriously examine its expansion policy. The Company has three 
main options for expansion: 1) Expand its footprint. SunTrust has looked at 
expansion into the Southwest and expansion into the Midwest and North remain 
possibilities. 2) Increase market penetration in current markets. This is the 
avenue for expansion that SunTrust has pursued. Since 2003, SunTrust has 
opened 219 branches inside its current footprint, the vast majority of these being 
located in cities in which SunTrust already has a presence.77 3) Expand into rural 
areas. Currently SunTrust is organized around cities, with little to no presence in 
outlying areas. 
o Expanding the footprint requires expansion through acquisition-
traditional brick and mortar branches must be purchased. Additionally, it 
is inefficient to be spread thin over a large area. Furthermore, by leaving 
the Southeast, Sun Trust would be entering a market that it has never 
competed in. 
o Increasing market penetration, the current strategy, has not seemed to 
work. There are over 30 branches in Knoxville; this is inefficient and 
prohibitively increases costs. The Claritas study cited earlier illustrates 
that the current policy has not increased market penetration. Market 
penetration can just as easily be established through marketing, 
advertising, and quality of service as through adding a 31 st branch. 
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o Expanding into rural areas is this analyst's preferred approach. This can 
be done relatively inexpensively through a proliferation of In-Store 
branches. These are full-service branches that are inexpensive to locate 
and operate. Currently, a Tennessee customer of SunTrust cannot find a 
branch or ATM between Lebanon and Knoxville. This does a disservice 
to customers. A strategy of expanding into targeted, potential high growth 
areas will benefit SunTrust through increased market penetration, 
increased service levels, lower costs, and efficiencies of scale. 
• SunTrust should implement a plan to "bank the unbanked." This enormous profit 
possibility has been largely ignored by banks. Free checking accounts can be 
promoted to this market segment. Other traditional financial services can be 
targeted to this group such as, check cashing services, money orders, and 
remittances. Remittances, in particular, can be used to attract the Hispanic 
immigrant population. This segment sends enormous amounts of money back to 
their homelands and most do not use banks. Simply promoting that this is a 
service banks offer is a large first step in the right direction. Once established as 
customers, this can be a profitable segment of the population for banks. Many are 
beginning lives in the United States, and will eventually need mortgages, credit 
cards, student loans, etc. By offering an inexpensive service that they need, banks 
can grab this market segment early and maintain this relationship for years. 
• SunTrust should look to outsource non-core functions. Ancillary services such as 
maintenance, PP&E, human resources, etc. should be evaluated for their potential 
to add value to the company. Units that do not should be scrapped in favor of 
outsourcing. 
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• SunTrust should look to mitigate the risk posed by third party ACH transmittal 
services such as Paypal. The threat that customers will one day be able to "bank 
without banks" is a real threat. This should be carefully examined, as it is 
potentially expensive. Potential solutions include acquisition, merger, or creation 
of an in-house operation that serves the same purpose. Person-to-person 
electronic transfers will happen, and SunTrust should work now to be on the right 
side of this industry shift. 
• SunTrust should make an effort to be more transparent and communicative with 
investors. This would help reduce the volatility of its stock price. For example, 
SunTrust recently announce an expense review.78 However, they have given very 
little insight into what specific actions they are taking or how much they expect to 
save. An analyst with Morgan Keegan & Co. Inc., wrote in a research note that 
he was "negatively surprised by the inability [and] unwillingness" of SunTrust's 
management to provide insight into its cost reduction plan.79 While transparency 
and communication are not sufficient to ensure a stable stock price, they are 
necessary. SunTrust should make efforts towards these goals if it desires a less 
volatile stock price. 
Conclusion 
SunTrust is a growing company competing in a challenging environment. The 
Company has shown strong revenue growth, income growth, and EPS growth. The 
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Company has shown an ability to innovate and try new strategies. However, there are 
significant hurdles and challenges on the horizon. The economy appears to be in a 
slowdown. The inverted yield curve presents a short-run tactical hurdle that must be 
navigated. In this environment, SunTrust must focus on diversifying its income stream, 
cutting costs, and reducing its risk. Furthermore, the Company appears to lack the capital 
that would enable it to expand substantially and compete on the level of Bank of 
America, J.P. Morgan Chase, and Wells Fargo. However, all signs point to SunTrust's 
continued viability and sustained success as a large, regional bank. Through 
implementation of key strategies, those outlined in this paper and those already 
undertaken by the Company, SunTrust should continue its trend of strong profits and high 
returns to investors. 
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